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Egypt has made enormous progress in increasing access to education. While school is 
theoretically free, families must often spend substantial sums in order for their children to 
succeed in school. The question that this paper investigates is whether students can succeed in 
Egypt’s basic education system, regardless of their family circumstances, and without additional 
spending. The paper begins by examining inequality in completing basic education and then 
investigates the use of supplements, such as private tutoring. Outcomes are examined by socio-
economic status, to illustrate how the need to supplement publicly provided basic education 
contributes to unequal opportunities for young Egyptians.  
 
 








Free education—promised in the Egyptian constitution—is considered a fundamental 
right of every Egyptian. Over the past three decades, Egypt has made substantial progress in 
increasing access to education and raising educational attainment. Net enrollment rates in 
primary education have increased from 64 percent in 1978 to 96 percent in 2009 (UNESCO, 
2015). Over a similar period the average years of schooling attained went from 2.7 to 7.1, putting 
Egypt among the top 20 countries globally in terms of increases in school attainment over that 
period (Campante & Chor, 2012). The focus in Egypt, as in many other countries and in the 
international discourse on access to education, has essentially been on increasing enrollments 
and attainment, often to the neglect of other important dimensions of education. There has been, 
until recently, insufficient concern about the demonstrably low school quality and low levels of 
learning students are achieving (Assaad, 2014; Salehi-Isfahani, Hassine, & Assaad, 2014; World 
Bank, 2008). There has also been limited societal debate about the substantial inefficiencies and 
inequities associated with public expenditure on education (El-Baradei, 2013). These issues 
mean that while education is theoretically free, substantial additional spending is often required 
by families to ensure that children learn and succeed within the education system. The need for 
additional spending contributes to young people’s unequal opportunities to attain education or 
achieve learning (Assaad, Salehi-Isfahani, & Hendy, 2014; Assaad, 2013; El-Baradei, 2013; 
Salehi-Isfahani, Hassine, & Assaad, 2014; World Bank, 2012). 
The problems of low quality, inefficiencies and unequal opportunities start within the basic 
education system, which in Egypt goes up to ninth grade and constitutes the mandatory stage of 
education. Although education quality is a difficult concept to define and measure, Egypt 
consistently shows quality deficits. Within the international education literature, quality tends to 
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be measured either in terms of inputs, for instance the pupil/teacher ratio, textbooks, or teacher 
training, or in terms of outcomes, such as literacy, test scores, life skills, and job skills 
(UNESCO, 2012, 2014). In terms of inputs, the public funding of basic education is inadequate 
(El-Baradei, 2013), contributing to low school quality. Employers also perceive little value in the 
skills conferred by the education system; Egypt was one of the lowest ranked countries in the 
2014-2015 World Competitiveness Report (141st out of 144 countries) in terms of the quality of 
primary education (Schwab, 2014).1 In terms of international tests such as the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) Egyptian students (and those from other 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa Region) perform poorly, with 53 percent of eighth 
graders falling below the low benchmark, compared to an international median of 25 percent 
(Assaad, 2014). 
In part because the quality of education is low, investments in education may generate low 
returns in the labor market. Annualized wage returns to basic education are estimated to be just 1 
percent per year of education (Said, 2015). The returns to basic education in Egypt are less than 
one-twenty-fifth the international average of 26.6 percent per year of primary education 
(Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004). If only returns in the private sector are taken into account, 
returns are even worse, less than 1 percent per year (0.1 percent per year for males and 0.4 
percent per year for females). While returns to all levels of education are relatively low in Egypt 
compared to other countries, basic education in Egypt has lower returns than secondary or higher 
education (Said, 2015). The low returns to education are likely important contributors to the 
youth frustrations that drove the Arab Spring uprisings. Education in Egypt had traditionally 
meant access to formal (mostly public) jobs that paved the way to a middle class existence, but it 
                                                
1 Based on the World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey.  
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has failed to live up to these expectations for recent cohorts of youth. The devaluation of 
education in recent decades has not only led to a great deal of anger and frustration on the part of 
educated youth, but also to persistent demands for social justice and more equal opportunities 
(Assaad & Krafft, 2014; Binzel & Carvalho, 2013; Binzel, 2011; Campante & Chor, 2012; Kuhn, 
2012). 
When the quality of education in public schools is poor, families who can afford it must 
often use other means to help their children succeed in school. In Egypt, the poor quality of 
public basic education has generated substantial demand for educational supplements or 
substitutes, such as private schooling, parental help, help groups, and especially private tutoring. 
Spending on basic education, and particularly on private tutoring is a substantial and rising share 
of the budgets of Egyptian households with school-age children (El-Baradei, 2013). Given the 
low quality of free public education, this supplemental private spending may be a critical 
element for succeeding in school, for those who can afford it.  
This paper examines whether free basic education is a reality or a myth in Egypt. The 
discussion begins with an examination of equity in access to, success in, and completion of basic 
education. The paper then investigates the use of education supplements and substitutes, such as 
private schooling and private tutoring or help groups, as well as the provision of study help by 
family members. Two key outcomes of basic education are also explored: the performance of 
students on tests during basic education, and their ability to pursue the general secondary track 
(higher education bound), as opposed to the poorly regarded and usually terminal vocational 
track after basic education. The differences in education experiences and outcomes by gender 
and socio-economic status are explored to illustrate how the need to supplement publicly 
provided basic education contributes to unequal opportunities for young Egyptians.  
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The overarching question that guides the paper is whether free basic education is a reality 
for most Egyptians or if substantial private spending on education is necessary for success. Are 
privately-funded educational supplements necessary? How does success in basic education vary 
based on children’s social origins and the resources their families are able to invest in their 
education? This will be investigated through two linked questions:  
1) Is there equality in accessing basic education? What inequalities of opportunity in completing 
and succeeding in basic education occur in terms of gender and socio-economic background? 
2) What role do education supplements, especially private tutoring, play in basic education and 
inequality of opportunity? What differences in education supplements and education 
outcomes occur by gender and socio-economic background? 
To answer these questions, this paper proceeds as follows. The second section presents the 
background, including frameworks for investments in education and unequal opportunities. 
Section 3 presents the data used and describes our methods. The fourth section describes the 
structure of the education system in Egypt. Section 5 presents the results in terms of accessing 
basic education, use of education supplements, and education outcomes. The last section 
concludes and provides policy recommendations.  
 
2. Frameworks  
The Egyptian constitution identifies a free education as the right of every citizen. This 
right is framed in terms of the socialization of young people into the nation’s character, identity, 
and culture, as well as in the instrumental terms of promoting innovation and meeting labor 
market needs (Egypt State Information Service, 2014). This articulation of the role of education 
in society reflects global debates about the role of education. Free education is often framed as a 
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human right, for instance as in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1990), to which Egypt is a signatory. The 
importance of equal opportunities is emphasized for this particular right of children, but such 
basic rights approaches tend to neglect issues of education quality. Education is also often 
framed as playing a key social and political role, both in terms of the state providing civic 
education (Cogan & Morris, 2001) and education being a key prerequisite to democratic political 
forms (Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2007). 
The instrumental, economic argument for public investments in education rests on 
substantial market failures that cause private demand for education to be lower than would be 
socially optimal. Substantial externalities (public benefits and spillovers) such as improvements 
in child health, reduced fertility, more effective political participation, or decreased crime are 
examples of justifications for public expenditure on education (Lindelow, 2008; T. P. Schultz, 
2002; Temple & Reynolds, 2007). That parents, deciding on education for their children, will not 
capture the full benefits can also lead to under-investment in education (Edmonds, 2008). 
Information issues, where parents or youth are unaware of the true returns to education (Jensen, 
2010), or credit constraints to investing in education (T. W. Schultz, 1961), all might act as 
justifications for public investment. Public investment should particularly target the levels of 
education and individuals who would not otherwise receive (enough) expenditure in the private 
market, as it is at these points that there is a justification for public investment in education. 
Currently, Egypt publicly funds primary through higher education, a policy that will, at least in 
the abstract, overcome some of the market failures, but at the expense of substantial spending on 
those who would otherwise attend and can afford to spend on education even if education were 
not free.  
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The human capabilities approach to education links together the intrinsic value of 
education, as a right, with more instrumental goals for education. This approach recognizes that 
the well-being of individuals is not just predicated on standard economic measures such as 
income, but on what individuals are free and able to do—their capabilities. Education is thus 
doubly important, as a route for expanding individuals’ capabilities, in addition to its value in the 
labor market or for other instrumental goals (Sen, 1999). Education quality is also particularly 
relevant for expanding capabilities and letting individuals achieve the goals they value (Tikly & 
Barrett, 2011). The extent to which individuals of all backgrounds are able to equitably access 
quality education in Egypt, i.e., whether free basic education is truly a reality, is thus of great 
importance.  
In investigating whether free basic education in Egypt is a myth or a reality, we 
empirically connect three interlinked issues. The first is the unequal and inefficient nature of 
public investments in education, making it difficult for many young Egyptians to learn and 
succeed in school. The second issue is the high and unequal investments in private supplements 
to education that many parents consider necessary for their children to succeed in the education 
system. Lastly, the result of the combined inadequacy of the public education system and 
unequal investments in private supplements is unequal opportunities for Egyptian children to 
succeed in basic education and beyond. This section provides some background, both theoretical 
and empirical, on these issues both globally and in Egypt. 
  
2.1 Unequal and Inefficient Public Investments in Education  
High rates of grade repetition and dropout (Elbadawy, 2015; Krafft, 2012) are symptomatic 
of inefficiencies within the education system in Egypt. When young people repeat a grade, it 
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doubles the amount of spending required to learn the same material and is a signal that the initial 
year of schooling was of insufficient quality to provide mastery of the material. Likewise, when 
young people drop out of school, it is often a symptom that the school system is failing to 
educate them. In examining the reasons stated for dropping out of school in a recent survey, after 
“I did not want to finish” (40 percent) and “the cost of uniforms and school fees” (19 percent), 
the next most common reason for dropout stated was “not doing well in school” (15 percent) 
(Population Council, 2011). This reason disproportionately affected children from less wealthy 
families and from rural areas. Research has demonstrated that children in Egypt are much more 
likely to drop out when experiencing a low-quality school environment (Hanushek, Lavy, & 
Hitomi, 2008; Lloyd, El Tawila, Clark, & Mensch, 2003). When children cannot succeed in 
school, particularly when it is due to the inadequate quality of schooling, it is clear that Egyptian 
society is not meeting its promise of a free education for all.  
In addition to issues of efficiency justifying public investment in education, issues of 
equity may motivate the provision or financing of education through public channels. The equity 
argument for public spending on education rests on equalizing access to education across people 
of different social circumstances. To do so, public investment needs to target disadvantaged 
children to compensate for otherwise poor early environments, high opportunity costs, or 
excessive discount rates and an absence of financing. Currently in Egypt, public education 
funding is essentially regressive. Per pupil public education funding increases with the level of 
education, so that those in higher education receive the most funding (El-Baradei, 2013). These 
are, however, the wealthiest individuals in society, creating substantial inequality and providing 
the most funding to those who need the state’s support the least (Assaad, 2013). Thus, public 
funding prioritizes higher levels of education for some at the cost of universal high quality basic 
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education for all. A policy of free public education at all levels, intended to provide opportunity 
for all, ends up instead in reproducing an unequal and regressive system. 
 
2.2 High and Unequal Investments in Education Supplements 
The inadequacy and inefficiency of public spending on basic education in Egypt results 
in the need for substantial private investments (by those who can afford it) in the form of 
educational supplements that reinforce quality and inequality issues. For instance, private 
tutoring is so widespread and extensive in Egypt that many students will skip attending school, 
especially in key exam years, and rely on private tutors for their instruction (Population Council, 
2011). While private tutoring can have positive impacts, such as improved learning, it also can 
misalign teachers’ incentives, create distortions in the curricula, and worsen inequalities (Bray, 
Zhan, Lykins, Wang, & Kwo, 2014; Bray, 2003; Dang, 2007; Tansel & Bircan, 2006). In an 
environment with both school day teaching and supplemental private tutoring by the very same 
school teachers, private tutoring creates an incentive for teachers to teach less during the school 
day (Popa & Acedo, 2006).  
In Egypt, teachers play a key role in whether public basic education alone is adequate for 
student success. A number of forces affect teachers’ efforts in school. Teacher pay has been 
largely stagnant in the face of rising inflation, yet teachers’ employment, as civil servants, is 
secure and their pay is unrelated to their performance in the classroom (Ille, 2015). Teachers 
therefore do not have strong incentives to perform well in their regular teaching. Additionally, 
they are motivated to generate income through other routes, such as private tutoring. This creates 
a serious incentive problem in the classroom; teachers will have higher income when they teach 
less. In order to generate demand for private tutoring, teachers may reduce the quality of 
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schooling during regular school hours (Ille, 2015; Jayachandran, 2014). The lower a teacher’s 
effort level in the classroom, the greater the incentives for students to take private tutoring with 
the teacher, thus increasing his or her income (Ille, 2015). As a result, when teachers can offer 
private tutoring, it reduces student learning and achievement, particularly for poorer students 
who are less able to access tutoring (Ille, 2015; Jayachandran, 2014). Thus, while private tutoring 
in Egypt may be necessary for success, it also further distorts the functioning of the education 
system. 
  
2.3 Unequal Opportunities to Succeed in Basic Education 
On the surface, the policy of free education in Egypt should provide children with equal 
chances to succeed in basic education; no child should be prevented from attaining a basic 
education because his or her family cannot afford school fees. This ideal is conceptually aligned 
with the idea of equal opportunity. Due to unequal public funding and low quality public 
schooling, compounded by the need for large private expenditures on education, the reality is 
severe inequality in the opportunity to learn and succeed. To assess inequality of opportunity in 
basic education, we draw on the framework developed by the well-known economist and 
philosopher John Roemer (1998). Conceptually, some inequality in outcomes, such as wages in 
the labor market or test scores in school, is a desirable aspect of a well-performing economy. 
When individuals are rewarded with higher wages or better grades because of the choices they 
make and the effort they expend, this creates strong incentives for higher performance. However, 
inequality due to circumstances beyond an individual’s control—what is termed inequality of 
opportunity—is problematic both as a matter of social justice and in disconnecting effort from 
outcomes. When a girl from a poor family is less likely to complete basic education simply 
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because of her gender and the economic circumstances of her family this is inequality of 
opportunity. Inequality of opportunity can be assessed empirically by looking at differences in 
education outcomes by gender and socio-economic characteristics.  
There is a substantial body of existing evidence indicating that there is inequality of 
opportunity in access to basic education in Egypt. This inequality starts at school entry. Although 
entry into primary school for Egyptian children is becoming almost universal, a most-
marginalized group, primarily girls from poor families in rural Upper Egypt, are still 
disadvantaged in that regard (Elbadawy, 2015; Krafft, 2012). Among those who do enter the 
school system, poorer youth are more likely to repeat a grade and also are more likely to drop out 
during basic education (Elbadawy, 2015; Krafft, 2012). Besides unequal attainment, students 
experience unequal school quality depending on their background, and achieve unequal levels of 
learning (Assaad, Salehi-Isfahani, & Hendy, 2014; Population Council, 2011; Salehi-Isfahani, 
Hassine, & Assaad, 2014). We provide additional evidence on inequality of opportunity, linking 
the roles of low-quality public schools, supplemental private investments, and ultimately unequal 
opportunities. 
  
3. Data and Methods 
Surveys are the primary source of data used to assess the question of whether free and 
universal basic education is a myth or a reality for children in Egypt. We rely on the nationally-
representative Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) of 2012, which includes rich 
information on education, including private supplements to education, as well as young people’s 
background and circumstances. The ELMPS 2012 is the third round of a longitudinal survey,2 
                                                
2 See Assaad and Krafft (2013) for detailed information on the different rounds of the ELMPS.  
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which allows us to look at the outcomes of students in the most recent round of the survey based 
on their circumstances in earlier rounds. For instance, we can look at how the wealth of a young 
person’s household in 2006 affected their probability of completing basic education by 2012. 
This allows us to be sure that we are observing how family circumstances affect education—not 
how education affects the economic outcomes of the household.  
The paper primarily relies on descriptive statistics to examine whether and how inequality 
in access to basic education, education supplements, and public spending occur along gender and 
socio-economic lines. Multivariate analyses are used to consider the net effects of different 
characteristics on outcomes. Although these methods are unable to identify causal relationships, 
they can identify important associations, and are interpreted as such. 
 
4. Background: The Structure of the Education System in Egypt 
Although pre-primary enrollments are expanding (Krafft, 2015), most young people in 
Egypt enter school at the primary stage. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the Egyptian 
schooling system. On-time entry occurs at age six, and primary school comprises grades one 
through six. Upon completion of primary education, students proceed to preparatory school for 
grades 7-9, which correspond to ages 12-14 if a student is progressing on time. The primary and 
preparatory stages comprise basic, compulsory education in Egypt. If students continue beyond 
basic education, they are tracked into either vocational secondary, which is usually a terminal 
degree, or general secondary, which implicitly guarantees access to higher education if the 
student completes the stage. Higher education comprises post-secondary technical institutes, 
which are two-year institutions, higher institutes and universities, which are four-year institutions 
and in some cases longer. Passing from the basic to the secondary stage or from the secondary to 
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higher education stage is contingent on high-stakes exams that not only determine whether the 
student is allowed to continue, but also determine the type of education they are able to pursue. 
 
Figure 1. Structure of the Egyptian Education System 
  Vocational secondary	 Post-secondary institutes	




Primary⇒	 Preparatory⇒	  Higher institutes	
Grades 1-6	 Grades 7-9	  Four-year	
 
End of compulsory 
schooling	 General secondary⇒	 University	
  Grades 10-12	 Four-year	
(Ages 6-11)	 (Ages 12-14)	 (Ages 15-17)	 (Ages 18 and up)	
Note: Ages in parentheses are ideal, assuming on-time entry and no repetition. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Basic Education: Access, Types of Schools, and Completion 
5.1.1 Who Accesses Education? 
There has been substantial progress over time in whether children actually enter primary 
school in Egypt (Figure 2). For Egyptians born in the 1950s, a substantial proportion never 
entered school and there was also a large gender gap in access. As shown in Figure 2, fewer than 
50 percent of females born in the 1950s entered school, while the rate among males born in that 
decade ranged from 65 to 80 percent. Among more recent birth cohorts, starting with those born 
around the year 2000, school entry was nearly universal. Additionally, the percentage of girls 
entering school has nearly caught up with that of boys for the cohorts born after the mid-1990s. 
Among the most recent birth cohorts who are of school entry age, individuals born from 2000 to 
2002, only 1 percent of boys and less than 4 percent of girls did not yet enter school. Essentially, 
the primary challenge facing the Egyptian education system has shifted over time, from a 
 
14 
historical challenge of ensuring that students entered school, to a challenge of ensuring that 
students complete basic education and achieve an adequate level of learning.  
 
Figure 2. School Entry by Year of Birth and Gender, 3-Period Moving Average 
(Percentage)  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
 
5.1.2 What Types of Basic Education do Students Attend? 
One of the methods families can use to address the inadequate quality of public basic 
education is to invest in education outside of the regular public system. In Egypt, alternatives to 
the regular public education system include public experimental schools, private regular or 
private language schools (the latter teaching in a foreign language such as English or French), or 
public Azhari (religious) schools. With the exception of Azhari schools, which are overseen by 
the Al-Azhar religious institution, all of these school types are overseen and regulated by the 
Ministry of Education and follow a standard curriculum.3 
                                                
3 In recent years, foreign schools that provide international credentials and whose curriculum is not overseen by the 



























The majority of students attend regular public schools for the basic education stage (Figure 
3). Between 84-87 percent of male and female students in primary and preparatory schools are in 
regular public schools. Azhari schools are the second most popular choice for primary and 
preparatory education, enrolling 8-9 percent of students. Private regular schools are the next 
most common form of education, enrolling 3-4 percent of students. Private language schools and 
public experimental schools each enroll only around 1-2 percent of students. 
It is primarily the richest households that send their children to private schools and public 
experimental schools (Figure 3).4 This is particularly true for primary schools where about 25 
percent of students from the richest fifth of households attend private schools and an additional 6 
percent attend public experimental schools, which appear to be limited to children from the 
richest quintile of households. Azhari schools remain a common choice for students in both 
primary and preparatory education regardless of wealth. These patterns of the richest households 
sending their kids to private school also align with another measure of socio-economic status, 
mother’s education (not shown). Private schools and public experimental schools are mostly an 
option for households with highly-educated mothers, with 46 percent of children with university-
educated mothers going to private or public experimental schools at the primary level. There is 
some use of private schooling and public experimental schools among those with secondary 
educated mothers (12 percent at the primary level), but essentially none among youth with 
mothers with less than secondary education. 
                                                                                                                                                       
by Egyptian standards. As a result they only serve a tiny proportion of the wealthiest families, and only a few 
children attending these schools appear in our surveys. We therefore include this category of schools with private 
language schools in our analyses. Home schooling, which is also used by only a few respondents, is included in 
private regular schooling.  
4 When examining youth who are not all currently in school, we use the wealth quintile of the individuals’ 
households in 2006 to make sure that the individual was still living with his/her parents and thus the variable truly 
captures parental wealth. Household wealth quintiles are based on a wealth index calculated using factor analysis on 





Figure 3. School Type by Level and Parental Wealth Quintile (Percentage) 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
Note: School type is for youth ages 13-22 in 2012. Parents’ wealth quintile is from 2006. 
 
5.1.3 Who Struggles During Basic Education? 
While Egypt has made great strides in ensuring children enter school, their success in 
basic education is not assured. One helpful metric to assess both the quality and efficiency of the 
education system is whether or not students are repeating grades during school. Repeating a 
grade occurs when a student is unable to master the material covered in a grade during the course 
of the school year. High grade repetition rates are a symptom of low-quality education. 
Repetition also contributes to inefficiency and high costs, as it takes twice the investment for the 
student to master the same material. In this section, we assess the chances a student repeats a 
grade during basic education5 as a symptom of students’ struggles in basic education.  
Grade repetition is common in Egypt, particularly during the preparatory stage. Around 5 
percent of students repeat at least one grade in primary education, and 9 percent in preparatory 
                                                
5 Students could repeat more than once within a level, but we do not quantify this possibility.  
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education.6 Male students are more likely to repeat a grade than female students. While 11 
percent of male students repeat in preparatory, only 6 percent of female students do so. There is a 
similar gap at the primary stage as well (7 percent male, 4 percent female repetition).  
The students who struggle the most to master the material of basic education are the 
students from the poorest wealth quintiles. Figure 4 shows the percentage of students who 
repeated a grade during primary or preparatory by wealth. Students in the bottom two wealth 
quintiles do by far the worst; 7-9 percent repeat during primary and 14-15 percent repeat in 
preparatory. In contrast, students from the richest wealth quintile have only a 1 percent chance of 
repeating in primary or preparatory. Family resources clearly intersect with the chances that 
children will succeed or struggle in basic education.   
 
Figure 4. Percentage Repeating a Grade by Wealth Quintile and School Level 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
Note: Youth ages 16-22 in 2012 who attended these levels in the past. Parents’ wealth quintile is from 2006. 
 
It is youth with less educated parents who struggle and repeat grades during basic 
education. While students with secondary or university educated mothers have only a 1-2 percent 
                                                



































chance of repeating a grade in primary or preparatory, those whose mothers have less than 
secondary education have a 7 percent chance of repeating during primary and an 11 percent 
chance of repeating during preparatory. Whether because mother’s education is linked to socio-
economic status, or more educated mothers can compensate for the inadequate quality of basic 
education, children face unequal chances of school success depending on their parents’ education.  
Overall, there are clear differences in students’ chances for school success depending on 
their backgrounds. Male students struggle more in school—evidenced by their higher rates of 
repetition—than female students. Students whose families are poor or whose parents are less 
educated struggle to succeed in basic education and have high repetition rates. In contrast, 
students from wealthier families or with educated mothers have greater success and easier 
progress during basic education. These differential experiences of struggles or success during 
basic education translate into different chances of completing basic education, as the next section 
demonstrates.  
 
5.1.4 Who Completes Basic Education?7 
Whether or not a child completes basic education or not will depend on a number of 
factors. Parents (and as they become older, children) will decide whether to continue with 
schooling depending on whether or not the benefits or value of schooling are greater than the 
costs of schooling. Costs include not just the direct costs, such as fees or uniforms, but the 
opportunity costs of children’s time. For instance, for boys, it may be possible to work at a young 
age, and so continuing in school imposes an opportunity cost in terms of income foregone. For 
                                                
7 In examining basic education completion rates by cohort of birth, we focus on those born prior to 1992, and are 
therefore at least 20 years of age in 2012, to ensure that those who will complete have had the chance to do so. By 
the same logic and to have a sufficient sample size to work with, in examining current completion rates, we focus on 
youth who were 18 to 22 in 2012. 
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girls, there is an opportunity cost both in terms of domestic labor (chores), as well as potentially 
working in the market or engaging in subsistence production. Girls may also face a reputational 
cost to attending school if they have to mix with boys or be exposed to potentially unsafe public 
spaces on the way to school. Parents will weigh this multitude of costs against the benefits of 
schooling. Particularly since the quality of schooling is poor and the private returns to basic 
education are low (Said, 2015; Schwab, 2014; World Bank, 2008), as children age and costs rise, 
families may decide not to have them complete a low-value basic education. 
Conditional on school entry (see Figure 2 for school entry rates), there has been a gradual 
increase in completion rates over time (Figure 5). The increases in both school entry and 
completing basic education conditional on school entry have led to a substantial increase in the 
chances of completing a basic education over time. While those who did enter school had a 60 
percent chance of completing basic education among the cohorts born in the 1950s, younger 
generations of Egyptians born in the 1980s and 1990s have conditional completion rates that 
exceed 80 percent. Conditional on school entry, the gender gap in completion rates narrowed 
early on, virtually disappearing by the 1970 birth cohort. This suggests that the gender gap in 
completing basic education for subsequent generations was entirely due to gaps in school entry. 
In fact, starting with cohorts born after 1980, girls had a higher conditional basic schooling 
completion rate than boys. Girls’ greater success in completing school, if they enter, is likely due 
to their better performance, including test scores (shown below) and lower rates of repetition 
(shown above). Girls also may face lower opportunity costs of remaining in school since they 




Figure 5. Completion of Basic Education by Gender and Year of Birth, among those ever 
Entering School, 3 Period Moving Average (Percentage)  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
 
Basic schooling completion rates are strongly dependent on socioeconomic background. 
While 79 percent of all youth who were 18-22 in 2012 had completed a basic education, this rate 
varies substantially with parental education. Youth with mothers educated at the secondary level 
or university level have basic education completion rates in excess of 97 percent, as compared to 
a rate of 73 percent for those whose mothers have less than a secondary education. There are no 
appreciable gender differences in the effect of parental education on basic school completion 
rates. 
The chance of completing basic education varies not only with parents’ education and 
gender but also with parental wealth (Figure 6). As expected, children from richer families are 
more likely to complete basic education. Boys from the poorest fifth of households have 
approximately a 61 percent chance of completing basic education and girls a 64 percent chance, 






























Figure 6. Completion of Basic Education by Sex and Parents’ Wealth Quintile in 2006, 
Ages 18-22 in 2012 (Percentage) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
 
 
In sum, we see young people have substantially different chances of completing basic 
education depending on parents’ education and parental wealth. It is clear that, despite a policy 
of free education for all, young Egyptians face unequal chances of completing a basic, 
compulsory education depending on their circumstances. The current system is inadequate for 
providing a basic education for all, with the poor and those from less educated families facing 
particular disadvantage. These differential chances also translate into very different public 
investments, for students attending public schools. For fiscal year 2012/2013, the annual cost per 
student of a year of primary school was LE 2,454 and the annual cost of a year of preparatory 
school was LE 3,634.8 As students differentially attend and complete basic education, they 
receive differential public investments. In the next sections, we explore the role of private 
investments and how it may contribute to the inability of disadvantaged groups to succeed in the 
face of low-quality public education. 
                                                
8 Data provided in correspondence with the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. As of July 8, 





































5.2 Use of Education Supplements 
In this section, we explore a variety of strategies parents can use to supplement public 
education in Egypt. Parents can assist their children with schoolwork, invest in more costly 
forms of schooling through the payment of tuition and fees, or invest in help groups or private 
tutoring for their children. If public education alone were sufficient to ensure school success, 
parents would not need to invest substantially in these supplementary strategies. Besides 
presenting descriptive statistics about the use of these alternative strategies, we discuss in this 
section the net effects of various circumstances on the use of education supplements based on the 
multivariate regressions presented in Table 1.9  
Parents are likely to help their children with school work during the first few years of 
primary school (not shown). However, students receive less parental help10 as they advance 
through the education system. This may be due to the inability of less educated parents to help 
with advanced material. In the first year of primary school 65 percent of students received 
parental help, but only 20 percent did so by the time they reached the third year of general 
secondary. Students mostly receive help from their mothers. Other members of the household 
also chipped in to help, particularly during the last years of the basic and general secondary 
levels. These are the years with high stakes exams, and may be when older siblings are asked to 
provide study help for exams.  
                                                
9 While we focus our discussion on gender and socio-economic patterns, regressions also include controls for 
Egypt’s regions to account for potential regional differences in education supplements, such as possible differences 
in the supply of help groups.  
10 What we refer to as parental help could also include help from other household members but, as we discuss below, 
it is primarily parents. The specific question was "Does a parent, sibling or relative help you with your studies?” 
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Private lessons become increasingly common as students advance in school. Overall, 53 
percent of current students in primary, preparatory, or general secondary take private lessons, 10 
percent participate in paid help groups that typically take place after hours on school premises, 
and 24 percent receive no help (including no parental help).11 On average, the number of subjects 
covered in help groups and private lessons is around three subjects. Use of private lessons ranges 
from around 33 percent during the first year of primary to 75 percent during the second year of 
general secondary (Figure 7). Private lessons are common in every school year, but particularly 
in years with government exams, such as the sixth year of primary, the third year of preparatory 
and the second year of general secondary. The prevalence of private tutoring, particularly around 
high stakes exams, indicates the inadequacy of school alone as a mechanism for success in these 
exams. It also suggests a key pathway for inequality of opportunity, in that the need for tutoring 
around high stakes exams will exclude poorer families from succeeding and progressing. 
  
                                                
11 The questions about help groups and private lessons refer to the last academic year and the questions about 
parental help refer to the current year. In order to calculate the percentage of children receiving no help, parental 
help in the previous year is assumed to be the same as the current year.  
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Figure 7. Percentage Taking Private Lessons, Help Groups, No Help by Grade and Level 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
Note: School years reported are the years attended in the previous academic year for current students, which is the 
year for which they report the receipt of private lessons and help groups. 
 
Help groups are not as common as private lessons mainly because they are either not 
available, or, if available, are perceived as not being as good as private lessons. Students who 
took private lessons were asked why they took private lessons and not just used the less costly 
help groups.12 Half of the students who took private lessons in both the primary and preparatory 
levels reported that they do not have access to a help group in their school or community. That 
help groups were offered but were not as good as private lessons was also a common issue (36-
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38 percent), followed by help groups not being offered in the subjects needed (8 percent). Help 
groups are a lower cost alternative to private lessons, but clearly an alternative that is not as 
readily available, or as helpful when it is available.  
 Classroom teachers are also often the tutors in private lessons and help groups. This is 
likely to create incentives for teachers not to fully cover the necessary material in class, in order 
to receive fees for the assistance provided outside of class. This incentive problem has been 
shown in other countries to decrease learning in school and particularly harm poorer students 
(Jayachandran, 2014). Both private lessons and help groups are primarily taught by classroom 
teachers, but help groups are slightly more likely to be taught by classroom teachers than private 
lessons. Classroom teachers handle 80 percent or more of help groups in all basic education 
years except during the last year of preparatory school. Increasing from around 60 percent in the 
early years of primary school, classroom teachers provide 71 percent to 74 percent of private 
lessons for students in the final years of basic education.13 
 
5.2.1 Who Receives Education Supplements? 
Private lessons and help groups are a source of help for both poor and wealthy students, 
but there are substantial differences in the chances of using these supplements by wealth. 
Wealthier students are able to receive more family help in their studies than poorer students. 
Students from the poorest quintile of households have only a 23 percent chance of parental help 
compared with 77 percent for students belonging to the richest quintile of households (Figure 8). 
Moreover, around a third of students from the poorest quintile take private lessons, but almost 
half of them end up without any source of supplementary help. The share of students not 
                                                




receiving any help drops sharply as wealth increases, to just 5 percent among those in the 
wealthiest quintile. Beyond the poorest quintile, around half of students receive private lessons. 
Help groups are a source of help for about 10 percent of students, a rate which does not vary 
appreciably across wealth quintiles. In the multivariate models (Table 1), there were statistically 
significant impacts for all wealth quintiles as compared to the poorest for parental help, private 
lessons, help groups, and receiving no help. The probability of no help dropped with increasing 
wealth, while the probability of private lessons, help groups, and parental help increased at 
higher wealth levels. 
  
Figure 8. Percentage with Parental help, Private Lessons, Help Groups by Parent’s Wealth 
Quintile 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
Note: Current students attending preparatory or primary schools. Parental wealth quintile is wealth quintile of 
current students in 2012. 
 
Students with less educated parents are by far the most disadvantaged in terms of education 
supplements (Figure 9). Among students with less than secondary educated mothers, 40 percent 
receive no help, just 26 percent receive family help, 40 percent receive private lessons, and 10 
percent attend help groups. More than half of students with mothers with secondary or higher 
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students with secondary or higher educated parents, multiple forms of help are clearly common, 
including combinations of family help, help groups, and private lessons. Students with highly-
educated mothers are more likely to receive family help and slightly less likely to receive private 
lessons compared to those with secondary educated mothers, suggesting there may be 
substitution of family help for private lessons among the more educated mothers. 
In the multivariate regressions (Table 1), having a secondary or university educated father 
significantly decreased the probability of no help and increased the probability of parental help, 
compared to a youth with a less than secondary educated father. While a secondary educated 
father significantly increased the probability of private lessons, the effect for a university-
educated father was not significant, and father’s education had no effect on help groups. Having 
a mother with secondary or university education as compared to no education significantly 
decreased the probability of no help and increased the probability of parental help, but had no 
effect on private lessons. Having a university-educated mother slightly decreased the probability 
of help groups, suggesting some substitution of family help for help groups for children of 
mothers more able to provide such help. Notably, different dimensions of socio-economic status 
have different effects on the types of education supplements used, taking into account multiple 
characteristics. While wealth increases the use of all supplements, parental education affects 
primarily parental help and does not have large additional effects on other forms of assistance, 




Figure 9. Percentage with Parental Help, Private Lessons, Help Groups, by Mother's 
Education 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
Note: Current students attending preparatory or primary schools. 
 
Although there are large differences in the use of education supplements by wealth and 
parent’s education, there are essentially no differences by gender, nor are there statistically 
significant differences in the multivariate regression models (Table 1). There are also few 
differences by type of school. Those in public experimental schools are slightly more likely to 
receive no help than those in public regular schools, but no other school type is significantly 
different from regular public schools. Those in private regular schools are slightly more likely to 
receive parental help than those in public schools, but again no other school type is different. 
There are no significant differences in the probability of private lessons by school type, after 
accounting for other characteristics, but compared to public regular schools, every other type of 
school is related to a significantly lower probability of help groups.  
The use of costly education supplements, particularly the use of private tutoring, is 
pervasive in Egypt. The common practice of teachers providing education supplements is likely 
to create perverse incentives, and reinforce the low quality of education in schools, requiring 
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school work, providing unequal assistance to children depending on their family background. 
There are large disparities in the assistance children receive depending on their background, but 
even the poorest families invest in education supplements, a clear sign that supplements are often 
required for school success. The necessity of providing supplements indicates that young people 
cannot succeed in basic education simply by attending free public schools. The inadequacy of the 
public education system requires supplements that are particularly likely to limit opportunities 
for students from less privileged backgrounds.  
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Reference probability: 0.370 0.214 0.295 0.258 
Female -0.007 -0.008 0.017 -0.003 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) 
Type of school (public 
regular omit.) 
    Public experimental 0.106* 0.001 -0.056 -0.089*** 
 
(0.050) (0.043) (0.042) (0.012) 
Private regular 0.023 0.134*** -0.008 -0.085*** 
 
(0.042) (0.040) (0.035) (0.011) 
Private language 0.074 -0.048 -0.042 -0.083*** 
 
(0.084) (0.056) (0.054) (0.018) 
Azhari 0.002 0.026 0.023 -0.053*** 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.013) 
Wealth quintile 
(poorest omit.) 
    Second -0.079*** 0.070*** 0.053** 0.028* 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012) 
Third -0.092*** 0.079*** 0.086*** 0.036** 
 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.013) 
Fourth -0.137*** 0.136*** 0.139*** 0.032* 
 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) 
Fifth -0.159*** 0.107*** 0.180*** 0.062*** 
 
(0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.018) 
Father’s education 
(less than sec. omit.)     
Secondary -0.105*** 0.164*** 0.042* -0.002 
 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) 
University -0.139*** 0.201*** 0.016 -0.023 
 
(0.020) (0.026) (0.024) (0.014) 
Mother’s education 
(less than sec. omit.)     
Secondary -0.155*** 0.313*** 0.029 -0.015 
 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) 
University -0.163*** 0.371*** -0.035 -0.047** 
 
(0.023) (0.031) (0.029) (0.016) 
Region (Greater Cairo 
omit.) 




























Reference probability: 0.370 0.214 0.295 0.258 
 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.026) 
Urban Lower Egypt -0.033 0.000 0.272*** -0.201*** 
 
(0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.024) 
Urban Upper Egypt 0.173*** -0.067* -0.061* -0.229*** 
 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) 
Rural Lower Egypt -0.004 -0.041 0.198*** -0.174*** 
 
(0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) 
Rural Upper Egypt 0.246*** -0.111*** -0.139*** -0.221*** 
 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) 
N (Observations) 7972 7972 7972 7972 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Notes: Regressions for probability are based on probit models. Marginal effects are presented here.  
Reference values are the probability when all categorical covariates are set to the reference, omitted category.  
 
 
In order to explicitly test the potential tradeoffs between different types of education 
supplements, we estimated bivariate probit models. These models allow for tests of the 
relationship (correlation (rho)) between different help strategies. The results are presented in 
Table 2. Although there is not a statistically significant relationship between parent help and help 
groups, there are significant tradeoffs (negative correlations) between parent help and private 
lessons, and particularly private lessons and help groups. These negative correlations indicate 
that parents see these strategies as substitutes for each other controlling for ability to pay and 
other characteristics. In summary, after accounting for other factors, there is no apparent tradeoff 
between parental help and help groups. Parental help and private lessons are clear substitutes, as 
are private lessons and help groups. This implies that providing additional help groups might 




Table 2. Correlation (Rho) Between Different Help Strategies (Based on Bivariate Probits) 
Relationship Correlation (Rho)	 Significance 
Parent Help & Private Lessons -0.167	 *** 
Parent Help & Help Groups 0.040	  
Private Lessons & Help Groups -0.291	 *** 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012.  




5.3 Education Outcomes 
In this section, we examine two important education outcomes in Egypt: test scores and 
tracking into general secondary versus vocational secondary at the end of the basic education 
stage. Test scores demonstrate whether students have mastered the material required to pass a 
level. We examine students’ performance on the exams taken during their sixth year of primary 
and third year of preparatory in Egypt. The preparatory exam is particularly high-stakes, as it 
determines whether students can access general secondary (university-track) or vocational 
secondary (which is almost always a terminal degree). Additionally, we present in Table 3 
multivariate regression models for preparatory test scores, the probability of entering the general 
secondary track, and the probability of entering the general secondary track after accounting for 
test scores. Theoretically, only test scores should determine tracking into general or vocational 
secondary, although test scores might be affected by students’ background. 
  
5.3.1 Test Scores in Egypt 
Primary students have slightly higher averages on their exams compared with preparatory 
students. Primary test scores averaged 80 on a scale of 100, compared with the mean of 76 
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achieved by preparatory students.14 Only a few students, about 4-5 percent, did not sit or failed in 
the exam. However, around half of students reported that they do not know their exam scores for 
both the primary (54 percent) and preparatory (43 percent) stages. For the remainder of the 
section, we report results based on only those who report a numerical score. Girls performed 
slightly better than boys in both levels. Scores of female students averaged 81 and 77 in their 
final primary and preparatory years, respectively, a 2-point advantage over the mean score of 
male students in the same years. In the multivariate models, although females averaged 1.5 point 
higher scores, the differences were not statistically significant (Table 3). 
There is a strong relationship between test scores and household wealth, a reflection of the 
greater resources wealthier families can draw upon to assist their children to succeed in school. 
Figure 10 shows a clear pattern of higher scores for students from wealthier households. Mean 
scores for primary students belonging to the wealthiest quintile of households reached 88, a 15-
point advantage over the mean score of students from the poorest quintile of households. 
Preparatory students from the wealthiest quintile of households, who scored an average of 84, 
had the same 15-point advantage over preparatory students from the poorest quintile of 
households. After accounting for other characteristics (Table 3) test scores were higher for every 
other wealth level compared to the poorest, but differences were significant only for the fourth 
(4.7 points higher) and fifth (8.2 points higher) wealth quintiles. 
  
                                                
14 Test scores are for ages 13-17 for primary level and ages 16-19 for preparatory level 
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Figure 10.  Test Scores by Parental Wealth 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
Note: Ages 13-17 for primary level and ages 16-19 for preparatory level. 
 
Mother’s education is also positively related to student performance.  Students with 
university-educated mothers reached mean scores of 91 and 87 in the primary and preparatory 
exams, respectively. However, students with less than secondary-educated mothers scored 15 
points less, on average, in both exams. Having more educated parents is significantly related to 
test scores even after accounting for other characteristics (Table 3). Compared to those with 
fathers with less than secondary education, those with secondary educated fathers had test scores 
that were higher by 4.6 points and those with university-educated fathers had test scores higher 
by 8.7 points. There were not significant differences comparing secondary educated mothers to 
mothers with a less than secondary education, but mothers with a university education were 
associated with a 3.6-point increase in test scores.  
Students going to the more common regular public and Azhari schools also have the 
weakest performance in exams with mean scores around or below 80, compared with those 
attending public experimental and private schools whose mean scores average at least 87; 
however this difference is likely due to only the most educated and wealthy families, who are 
high-scoring anyway, sending their children to these schools. 
73 75 78 
82 88 




















5.4 Tracking into General Secondary versus Vocational Secondary 
One of the most important measures of success in the basic education stage is whether or 
not a child is then able to track into general secondary education or relegated to the inferior 
vocational secondary track. Although providing vocational secondary education is touted 
globally as having a strong economic rationale, the global evidence does not support vocational 
secondary as superior to general secondary education (Bennell, 1996; Kahyarara & Teal, 2008; 
Moenjak & Worswick, 2003; Newhouse & Suryadarma, 2011; Pugatch, 2014). The vocational 
secondary track in Egypt can be characterized as inferior on a number of grounds. Vocational 
secondary is attended by students with lower test scores in preparatory; only those who have 
high test scores can attend general secondary and subsequently higher education. Vocational 
secondary is poorly regarded by society and employers (OECD/The World Bank, 2010; World 
Bank, 2013), in part because the skills and equipment used tend to be outdated, instructors are 
poorly trained, and connections to the private sector are weak (OECD/The World Bank, 2010; 
UNDP & Institute of National Planning, 2010). As a result, only a minority of attendees report 
receiving hands-on training that was useful in the labor market (Krafft, 2012). Because of the 
poor quality of their education, recent vocational secondary graduates earn no higher wages than 
those with lower levels of schooling (El-Araby, 2013; Krafft, 2013). Those who go on to general 
secondary and then higher education do ultimately obtain better jobs and higher wages (Assaad 
& Krafft, 2014; El-Araby, 2013; Krafft, 2013; Salehi-Isfahani, Tunali, & Assaad, 2009). Thus, 
attending general as opposed to vocational secondary, for those who continue on for secondary 
education, represents a highly desirable outcome. 
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This section investigates the chances of attending general secondary as an outcome of the 
basic education stage. The average chance of attending general secondary (among those 
attending secondary) is 44 percent. The probability of tracking into general secondary is 
significantly higher for females than males by 8.5 percentage points, but this difference 
disappears once test scores have been accounted for (Table 3).  
There are significant differences in the probability of entering the general secondary track 
by wealth (significant for third through fifth wealth levels as compared to the poorest), a 
difference as high as 27.1 percentage points for the richest fifth of households compared to the 
poorest fifth. Even at the same test scores, wealthier students have higher chances of general 
secondary. Figure 11 shows the observed probabilities of attending general secondary by scores 
in the preparatory exam for students from different wealth levels. Children from the richest 
quintile of households clearly have an advantage in accessing general secondary education over 
other students. For the wealthiest quintile of students, the probability of attending general 
secondary school is substantially higher than the rest even when they achieve the same test 
scores. The gap is particularly striking among students with low scores. At scores of 60 a student 
from the wealthiest quintile of households still has a 30 percent probability of attending general 
secondary school. In contrast, students belonging to the first to the fourth quintile with scores 
around 60 have little chance of making it to general secondary.  
For all but the wealthiest students with scores below 65, there are no notable differences in 
the probabilities of attending general secondary school. However, for those who reach the cut-off 
score of 70, the chances of getting into general secondary vary, with those from the third and 
fourth quintiles gaining higher chances of attending general secondary schools than those from 
the bottom two quintiles. In the case of the least wealthy students, the probability of accessing 
 
37 
general secondary level only increases substantially when they reach scores above 80. After 
accounting for test scores (Table 3), the fourth and fifth wealth levels have significantly higher 
chances of general secondary, as high as a 25.1 percentage point increase for the richest fifth of 
households as compared to the poorest fifth. Because a one point higher preparatory score 
increases the probability of general secondary by 1.3 percentage points, a student from the 
poorest fifth of households would have to get a twenty point higher test score to have the same 
probability of general secondary as a student from the richest fifth of households.  
 
Figure 11. Wealth, Test Scores, and Probability of Entering the General Secondary Track, 
Ages 16-19 in 2012 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
 
 
There are also significant differences by parents’ education, comparing both secondary and 
university educated mothers and fathers to less than secondary educated parents before 
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accounting for test scores. After accounting for test scores, there are not significant differences 
for secondary educated mothers or fathers, but the probability of general secondary is 
significantly higher with a university educated father (14.2 percentage points) or mother (21.4 
percentage points). Overall, family background impacts not just school performance, but 
secondary tracking even after accounting for performance.  
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 Table 3. Regression models for test scores and type of secondary, Ages 16-19 in 2012 





(with test scores) 
Model: OLS Probit marginal effects 
Probit marginal 
effects 
Reference value: 71.99 0.152 0.247 
Female 1.483 0.085*** 0.062 
 
(0.800) (0.022) (0.032) 
Wealth quintile (poorest omit.) 
   Second 1.943 0.040 0.091 
 
(1.651) (0.036) (0.067) 
Third 2.900 0.093* 0.125 
 
(1.635) (0.038) (0.072) 
Fourth 4.656** 0.138*** 0.187** 
 
(1.718) (0.038) (0.067) 
Fifth 8.230*** 0.271*** 0.251*** 
 
(1.927) (0.048) (0.076) 
Father’s education (less than 
sec. omit.)    
Secondary 4.608*** 0.159*** 0.068 
 
(1.192) (0.032) (0.044) 
University 8.721*** 0.347*** 0.142* 
 
(1.517) (0.055) (0.066) 
Mother’s education (less than 
sec. omit.)    
Secondary 2.182 0.119*** 0.030 
 
(1.302) (0.034) (0.043) 
University 3.562* 0.330*** 0.214* 
 
(1.701) (0.080) (0.085) 
Region (Greater Cairo omit.) 
   Alex. and Suez Canal -1.698 -0.077 -0.092 
 
(1.651) (0.051) (0.060) 
Urban Lower Egypt 0.690 -0.037 -0.022 
 
(1.332) (0.046) (0.054) 
Urban Upper Egypt 0.099 0.010 0.071 
 
(1.150) (0.046) (0.054) 
Rural Lower Egypt 2.017 -0.072 -0.026 
 
(1.228) (0.043) (0.048) 
Rural Upper Egypt -4.033** -0.088 -0.011 
 












  N (Observations) 994 2114 785 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELMPS 2012. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Notes: Regressions for probability are based on probit models. Marginal effects are presented here. 
Reference values are the test scores or probability of general secondary when all categorical covariates are set to the 
reference, omitted category. The reference value is simply the constant for the OLS model. In the model for general 
secondary including test scores, the reference value is for all categorical covariates set to the reference and test 
scores as observed. 
  
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Free basic education in Egypt is failing Egyptian children. A policy of free education, 
designed to promote opportunities for children, has led to a distorted system where there is 
substantial inequality in succeeding in basic education depending on a child’s family 
circumstances. With an under-funded basic education system, children are not guaranteed 
success through school alone. Substantial expenditures on basic education supplements, 
particularly private tutoring, are often necessary to succeed. These expenditures further 
exacerbate the unequal chances students of different backgrounds are facing for school success. 
Children from wealthier and more educated families have much higher chances of attending 
private schools and receiving education supplements such as tutoring. This contributes to further 
inequality in not just completion of basic education, but unequal performance on tests and 
unequal access to general secondary and thus higher education.  
The current system is clearly not meeting its goals of providing equitable and adequate 
education for Egyptian children. The failure of the public education system to provide quality 
education equitably to young people has contributed to the sense of social injustice articulated in 
the January 25th, 2011 revolution in Egypt. While Egypt, like other Arab countries, rapidly 
expanded its education system, raising youth expectations, rising education levels were met with 
diminishing opportunities in the labor market (Assaad & Krafft, 2014; Campante & Chor, 2012). 
Attempts to secure quality education and quality jobs through additional education investments 
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have also been largely fruitless (Assaad, Krafft, & Salehi-Isfahani, 2014; Assaad & Krafft, 2014). 
As with other areas of human development in Egypt and much of the Middle East and North 
Africa region (Assaad, Krafft, Hassine, & Salehi-Isfahani, 2012; Assaad, Salehi-Isfahani, & 
Hendy, 2014; El-Kogali & Krafft, 2015; Ersado & Aran, 2014; Krafft & El-Kogali, 2014; Salehi-
Isfahani, Hassine, & Assaad, 2014), inequalities in education are limiting human rights, 
preventing the equitable development of individuals’ capabilities, and precluding social justice.  
The problems within the education system are complex, and no single policy can address 
them all. However, a series of reforms targeting school financing, altering the incentives schools 
and educators face, and providing support to students in need can make a substantial difference 
in both education quality and equality within the education system.  
How education is funded in Egypt needs to undergo substantial changes. Despite 
substantial public spending, all levels of education are underfunded. As it stands, young people 
cannot succeed with free basic education alone. Education is supposed to receive a greater public 
investment per the new Egyptian constitution (Egypt State Information Service, 2014). 
Particularly given rising demographic pressures (Krafft & Assaad, 2014; Youssef, Osman, & 
Roudi-Fahimi, 2014), further investments may be needed to improve equity and quality.  
`There are also some important opportunities even within education system funding to 
address equity. Currently, spending increases with the level of education. Yet access decreases at 
higher levels. For instance, while just 9 of young people from the poorest fifth of households 
attend university, 80 percent of young people from the richest fifth of households go to 
university (Assaad, 2013). This pattern makes education spending, particularly public spending 
on higher education, extremely regressive (Assaad, 2013; El-Baradei, 2013). The cost structure 
must change. Higher education should no longer be free of charge; students and families should 
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contribute a large share of the costs of higher education, with scholarships for those who can 
demonstrate financial need and merit. Savings from the higher education budget should be 
directed towards basic education, including pre-primary education, which is currently not 
available to all free of charge (UNESCO International Bureau of Education, 2006), unlike every 
other level of schooling, and where there is substantial inequality of opportunity (Krafft & El-
Kogali, 2014). Easing regulations on private schools and encouraging growth and competition 
among private schools—which wealthy families are more likely to use—could also allow the 
rich to opt out of the public school system and free up public resources to improve basic 
education for less wealthy students. Such savings could enable the government to increase 
investments in basic education quality.  
The need for families to invest in private supplements to education is unlikely to be 
resolved solely by channeling additional resources into the existing system. Additional 
investments in education can have wildly varying effects on education outcomes depending on 
the nature of the investments (Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, & Ravina, 2013; Kremer, Brannen, 
& Glennerster, 2013; McEwan, 2014). Raising teachers’ salaries within schools may help to 
address the strong incentives for teachers to provide private tutoring to their own students, and its 
damaging effect on opportunities and learning. Simply prohibiting teachers from tutoring their 
students is unlikely to be enforceable or effective. Teachers’ and schools’ incentives need to be 
addressed more directly. Stronger incentives and organizational changes may be more effective 
than additional resources; an experiment in Kenya found that approximately halving the pupil-
teacher ratio had little impact on test scores, but using local teachers on short contracts and 




Although frequently advocated, direct financial incentives targeting teachers (performance 
payments) have shown mixed impacts globally, with impacts on student outcomes that range 
from small to impressive (Glewwe, Ilias, & Kremer, 2010; Lavy, 2009; Sojourner, Mykerezi, & 
West, 2014; Springer, Ballou, Hamilton, et al., 2010; Sundararaman, 2011). While worth testing 
in Egypt, rewards and incentives need to be structured very carefully so the policy does not result 
in perverse effects, such as teaching to only the best students, or teachers being unwilling to 
work in poorer areas because, in the absence of educated parents at home, students may improve 
less. Having meaningful measures of student success is also very important in designing teacher 
incentives. A randomized study of the effectiveness of teacher incentives in Kenya found that, 
while incentives caused increases in the tests for which teachers were rewarded, this was 
primarily driven by increases in multiple-choice-question scores, and did not correspond to 
improvements on other exams (Glewwe, Ilias, & Kremer, 2010). Thus the design of incentives 
and how learning and gains are measured are both extremely important to whether incentives 
will substantially improve learning (Mizala & Romaguera, 2004).  
Additional accountability can be achieved by making both schools and teachers more 
accountable to parents and local communities for their performance. Egypt’s education system is 
highly centralized. Decentralizing authority and resources to local school districts or school 
boards is often touted as a key reform to increase accountability and improve outcomes (El 
Baradei, 2015; World Bank, 2008). For instance, local authority to fire teachers who limit their 
teaching during the school day in order to receive private tutoring income (Ille, 2015; 
Jayachandran, 2014) could help address linked quality and equity issues in basic education. 
Decentralization is not a panacea; a randomized evaluation of four different interventions to 
strengthen school committees in Indonesia found that grants and training had little effect, but that 
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linking the school committee to the village council and democratic elections of school committee 
members significantly improved test scores (Pradhan, Suryadarma, Beatty, et al., 2011). 
Involving parents in school-based management committees in rural Mexico reduced grade failure 
and grade repetition (Gertler, Patrinos, & Rubio-Codina, 2008). While in Argentina, 
decentralization measures improved overall outcomes (Galiani, Gertler, & Schargrodsky, 2008), 
they did not help the poor, but in Bolivia decentralization helped the poorest areas by increasing 
their resources (Faguet & Sánchez, 2008). Context and design of decentralization measures 
determines their effectiveness. Decentralization does not necessarily improve education 
outcomes and quality, and its effects are contingent on local capacities, policy design, and 
complementary and supportive resources (Chapman, Barcikowski, Sowah, Gyamera, & Woode, 
2002; Chikoko, 2009; de Guzman, 2007; El Baradei, 2015; Gershberg, Meade, & Andersson, 
2009). Any attempt to implement decentralization reforms in Egypt should draw on the richness 
of international experience on what is and is not effective. 
Addressing some of the quality problems in basic education, such as poor funding and 
teacher and school incentives, will help equalize opportunities for students to some extent. 
However, additional targeted policy measures need to address children’s unequal opportunities 
directly. Education policies play an important role in educational inequality and later in labor 
market inequalities. One study found that the policy that can lead to the largest reduction in 
education inequality is public pre-primary education (Checchi & van de Werfhorst, 2014). More 
must be done in Egypt to ensure children enter school on equal footing, and early childhood 
programs such as pre-primary education play a particularly important role in equalizing 
opportunities. For instance, an early childhood program in Indonesia reduced the achievement 
gap between rich and poor children when they entered school (Jung & Hasan, 2014). 
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Besides policies that help place children on equal footing before they start basic education, 
policies that help struggling and disadvantaged students during the school years are important. 
Policies and programs must address and compensate for poor home environments and ensure that 
students have all the help they need to master material. Programs for students who have poor 
performance and who are at risk of failure or dropout can take a number of forms. Special 
instruction for children who are failing is one important element of addressing inequality. 
Additional or special instruction can be extra time after school, extra days of school during 
breaks or summer, or targeted help during the school day. Targeted additional instruction helped 
address repetition and dropout and improved educational outcomes in Latin America (Randall & 
Anderson, 1999). Remedial tutoring for struggling students can be extremely cost effective. A 
remedial tutoring program in India targeting students struggling with basic numeracy and literacy 
used young women from the community to deliver tutoring by taking students out of class for 
tutoring during the school day. The program had a large impact on learning outcomes (Banerjee, 
Cole, Duflo, & Linden, 2007). Particularly in the context of Egypt, where mastery of the material 
during the normal school day is difficult in the face of private tutoring, public or publicly funded 
programs that provide additional instructional time to disadvantaged or struggling students are 
important. 
Moving forward, Egypt must take a number of steps in order to ensure that students have 
equal chances to succeed in basic education regardless of their background. Shifting funding 
from higher education, by imposing cost sharing at that level, could provide substantial 
additional resources for basic education. Additional spending on education is also planned; the 
constitution of January 2014 mandates that pre-university education spending be 4 percent of the 
gross national product (Egypt State Information Service, 2014), an increase over current levels 
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(El-Baradei, 2013). The additional funds for education should be, at least in part, managed at the 
local school level by parent committees to strengthen incentives and accountability.  
The quality of basic education in Egypt is very low, and this is reflected in the poor 
ranking of Egypt’s education in comparison to other countries (Schwab, 2014), as well as 
essentially zero returns to basic education in the labor market (Said, 2015). Families often must 
invest in substantial additional expenditures in order to ensure their children can succeed in 
school; so-called “free” basic education in Egypt is a myth. Children face low and unequal 
chances of school success as a result of the low quality, inefficiencies, and incentive problems 
within the school system. Improving the quality of basic education and addressing inequality in 
school success will require a concerted effort on a number of fronts, but is vital to the 
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